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Forgetting the Subject
garnering these very same goods that it appears to jeopardize? Nietzsche argues
that it does. This is most clearly reflected in his account of the development of
the individual and its significance in the growth and course of moral psychology.
In forgetting the subject, Nietzsche endeavors to supply a new way of conceiving
the subject that he thinks is more suitable to a metaphysics that would relinquish
permanence, and he does this in such a way as to emphasize the significance
and value offorgetting itself, which at the same time calls into question how we
think about knowledge. Thus, Nietzsche's forgetting of the subject bears on the
most central concerns in philosophy despite the marginal status of forgetting in
its history and the marginal attention forgetting has received in the secondary
literature on Nietzsche.
To develop these points, this essay is divided into five sections. In the first, I
selectively consider some prominent ideas about forgetting in the history of philosophy. This section is useful for appreciating some of the ideas that Nietzsche
exPlicitly addresses in his own work. The account also highlights certain ideas
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It is possible to live almost without memory, and to live
happily moreover, as the animal demonstrates; but it is altogether impossible to live at all without forgetting.
-On The Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life
Why must the preying lion still become 'a child? The child

is innocence and forgetting, a new beginning, a game, a
self-propelled wheel, a first movement, a sacred "Yes."

-Thus Spoke Zarathustra 1: On the Three Metamorphoses
Remembering is possible only on the basis of forgetting,

and not the other way around.
-Heidegger, Being and Time

The subject of forgetting, generally, is intentionally marginalized in the history
ofWestern philosophy. As paradigmaticallythe "science ofknowledge" or, more
broadly, the "love of wisdom,n philosophy characteristically strives to grasp and
preserve, to have and to hold forever, its objects of investigation and the fruits of
its labor. Forgetting threatens such an enterprise. It indicates weakness, decay,
and deficiency. From the perspective of moral philosophy, forgetting is not only
an indication of cognitive inferiority; it is a potentially sinister apd reckless trait.
FOrgetting is the nemesis of what advances philosophy's aims, namely remembering. Thus, there should be little surprise that the history of philosophy does not
elaborately treat forgetting, remaining focused on memorializing truth, goodness, and the fundambltal nature of reality. But does forgetting play a role in
34

about philosophy itself, learning, and truth that continue to be embraced today.
I briefly consider also how forgetting has been treated by several thinkers following Nietzsche in order to supply the basis for a later section that will treat
how the significance of forgetting in Nietzsche's philosophy has yet to be fully
appreciated. In the second part, I elaborate the role of forgetting in Nietzsche's
account of the formation of the self. It draws on one of the more potent discussions of forgetting in his works, and it is crucial to his account of the development of human moral psychology. I argue that mistaking the role of forgetting
in Nietzsche's account greatly affects whether one appreciates the end of the
story he tells in the Genealogy and the possible future he envisions for humanity,
namely how Zarathustra is supposed to facilitate the "overcoming'' ofhumanity.
How this process is tied to the history of moralization is more elaborately addressed in the third section, which considers how Nietzsche connects the battle
against forgetting with cruelty. Nietzsche specifically ties the torturous practices
of mnemonics to the development of reason. I discuss the passages in Nietzsche's
Genealogy where these ideas are introduced and then more fully develop those
ideas in the broader context of Nietzsche's philosophy generally. In the fourth
section, I claim that the idea of forgetting the subject provides a reflective basis
for the development of an ecstatic logic that is compatible with Nietzsche's critique of Platonic metaphysics and the epistemological views it supports. By way
of conclusion, I recap and emphasize what is lost in the continued marginalization of forgetting not only in Nietzsche's works but als8 in philosophy generaHy.
Finally, I suggest some paths for further pursuit.
I. Forgetting History
Of course, Nietzsche is not alone in the history of philosophy in reflecting on for-

getting, although his interest joins him to a rather sparsely populated community
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of philosophers. Plato certainly stands out as concerned about forgetting, but
the apparent views of his character Socrates have had a lasting influence on
how forgetting has been pUshed to the margins of concern in philosophy ever
since. The so-called theory of recollection is perhaps the best-known example of
philosophical discussion that bears on the matter of forgetting. Recollection is
supposed to account for how learning is possible at all. According to this view,
learning is not a matter of being filled up with new things (a process that proves
difficult to imagine and which has the consequence of presenting knowing as a
passive process) but rather is a matter of recollecting what it is that one already

has as contents of knowledge. The Meno's uneducated slave, who proves himself
competent in geometry when appropriately prompted, is supposed to illustrate
a case in point. We know, but don't always know that we know, many things,
and education is aimed at educing such knowledge from us. We are constituted
knowing, but have somehow forgotten. The task then of education and philosophy more generally is to overcome this forgetfulness.

Forgetting the Subject
the myth as it relates to the significance of forgetting-drinking the water at Lethe
was necessary; the fact of drinking was not itself the indication of weakness or
degeneration. The problem, for those who fared poorly, was not that they drank
at all but rather that they exceeded their reasonable measure. Thus, forgetting
might yet play an important role in the formation of the basis of the lives that
become ours (although this is not explained). If so, then the task of philosophy
is to temper forgetting-not eliminate it-to keep it from exceeding its bounds.
But this sense of forgetting from Plato's myth was not saved. 3
forgetting doe.s appear much later in the history of philosophy, in the philosophy ofSchopenhauer, as playing an important role in shaping the basis of our
lives and ·sense of ourselves. Forgetting oneself is important for Schopenhauer,
since that self that we think we are (on account of the principium individuationis) is merely a representation of will and not the effect of an independent will
that we in essence truly are. "Forgetting [of] oneself as individual" is an important insight for Schopenhauer and serves as the basis for being in a position to

One explanation ofhow we managed to forget what we already know, such

momentarily still the will whose cravings are the source of our suffering and

that it needs to be brought out of us, is suggested in the Republic's Myth ofEr (another is found in the Phaedrus). At the end of the long journey during which the
transmigration of souls from one life to another is accomplished, the participants
must cross the hot, dry plain of Lethe (literally "forgetfulness"), where they are
given the opportunity to drink from a river. "All of them had to drink a certain
measure of this water," we are told, "but those who weren't saved [sDizomenous]
by reason drank more than that, and as each of them drank, he forgot everything and went to sleep" (Republic 62la. 1 Compare this line with 62lb in which
Socrates tells Glaucon in explaining how Er returned to his body to tell the story,
"And so, Glaucon, this is a story that was saved and not lost," in which the word
esOthe appears. Both words translated as "saved" have the root sOzO, meaning to
save, preserve, and remember. These multiple meanings are later exploited by
Heidegger.) Presumably, variety in depth of intellection and ease of recollection
can be explained, then, according to how much or what measure of water one
drank from the river at Lethe. Those whose souls were not conditioned to ascertain the measure that was appropriate (i.e., those without a sense of justice, those
with less refined rational powers) drank too much and thus set for themselves a
difficult course in their next lives. They will have already forgotten so much that

dissatisfaction (Schopenhauer,l966, I:199; see also Parkes, 1994, pp. 60-89, esp.
68ff for discussion of how this relates to Nietzsche's conception of subjectivity
and forgetting, particularly in light of The Birth of Tragedy and the conception of
Dionysian ecstasy [Rausch]. I more fully develop similar ideas in my section four
below). For Schopenhauer, it is crucial to forget what was the most transparent
and self-evident phenomenon for Descartes, the basis for all possible knowledge,
namely the "1," or the self. Such forgetting is necessary not only for any possible
happiness, for Schopenhauer, but also for our understanding of the truth of the
way the world really is.
As noted above, a dependency of truth on forgetting is saved in the Greek
word aletheia. Truth conceived as nonforgetting at first glance appears to set up
the two terms as polar opposites, as though they might be mutually exclusive
or perhaps essentially contradictory. Indeed, this is how much of the history
of philosophy has regarded the relation between truth (or wh~t is known) and
what is forgotten (what is not known), but some modern philosophers have suggested that such a view was not sh~ed by certain ancient Greek philosophers
themselves, at least not the predecessors of Socrates. Heidegger, of course, makes
much of this idea. In his effort to revive a sense of truth that he alleges has been
forgotten since Plato, Heidegger emphasizes the significance of forgetting as a
fundamental feature of human ontology and the understanding of some of the
most basic philosophical questions.
Quite unlike many of his predecessors, Heidegger gives prominence to
forgetting when he writes that "remembering is possible only on the basis of for-

recollecting will be difficult, and they will not be able to choose well the things
that are worth pursuing in their new lives. Forgetting will make them morally

degenerate and less happy. The goal of philosophy, of the exercise and enhancement of the rational powers, the myth instructs us, is to avoid forgetting so that
one may choose and fare well (eu prattOmen).l
Two points ai'e worth underscoring at this juncture. The first is that this
story reminds us of the etymology of the common Greek word for truthaJetheia-literally, non-forgetting, an idea to which I shall return shortly below.
And the second is that there is at least another way of interpreting the upshot of

getting and not the other way around" (Heidegger, 1996, 11:4, §68). With this,
Heidegger reiterates a predominant theme in his writings: human beings have
forgotten Being. This resembles the Platonic idea ofhaving knowledge, or the truth,
without realizing it until it is drawn out of us. (And given the way Heidegger
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emphasizes truth as a kind of relationship or communion with Being and the way

in which he conceives of the emergence of this relationship as an event, especially
in his later writings, it might also be the case that Heidegger, like Plato, has his

own mythos to go along with his conception of the relation between forgetting
and remembering, too.) For Heidegger, we quite dearly have some understanding
of Being-we do, after all, make claims about the existence of things and their
character, and we convey such understanding not only in our use of language,
but also in our use of things, in the way in which we interact with them in the
world and the way in which they can become for us objects of care. Moreover,
the very fact that we can even ask the question "What is Being?" suggests that
we at least have some sense of what it is that we are seeking. But we fail to "save"
{or remember) what we gather from the standpoint of interacting with beings in
relations characterized by care.
Part of the explanation for this forgetting is that such relations, which are
themselves interpretations (for Heidegger, ways of taking something as something), do not yet rise to the level of a theoretical or conceptual understanding. It
is dear that this is not a case of forgetting in the usual use of the term, although
it could be a case of forgetting in the sense of not "saving" what we have been
shown, which echoes somewhat the Platonic association of saving and remembering.4 Heidegger's conception of phenomenology, as introduced in §7 of Being
and Time, and his characterization of what he calls the "circle of understanding"
(e~p. §§ 31-34) provide a basis for more fully elaborating this relation. Another
explanation for forgetting, as Heidegger considers it, is that what is disclosed to us
in our relations to things in the world gets forgotten or obscured (for Heidegger,
"covered up") through the application of ready-made interpretations supplied by
the history of metaphysics and the variety of ways in which it conceives ofbeing
as itself an entity or thing and the commonplace adaptations of such metaphysical
concepts that have made their way into everyday language. This influences not
only how we relate to other entities in the world, including other human beings,
but also how we relate to ourselves (our conceptions of self and what is meant by
"I") and to the most basic philosophical questions that we can ask. The tasks of

philosophy as they relate to forgetting, then, for Heidegger include: l) developing
an understanding of human beings as fundamentally in a condition offorgetfulness (i.e., of not saving all that is potentially apparent to us), and 2) overcoming

the forgetfulness that the history of philosophy has facilitated.
I have given priority here to the ideas ofHeidegger because it seems to me
that virtually no one after Nietzsche gives greater prominence to the idea of forgetting than he, and Heidegger draws upon a number of the ideas that I have emphasized in the history of philosophy while at the same time developing his own
-views on the matter. 5 There are a number of people after Nietzsche, who make
mention of Nietzsche's emphasis on forgetting. Among them are Deleuze, Der.
rida, and Kofman. I make mention of each of these in various sections below and
do not include them in this survey section because their comments on forgetting

'

are generally brief or are made almost entirely in relation to making observations
about Nietzsche's philosophy. Thus, I treat them as I reach the relevant point in
my discussion of Nietzsche's view, to which I now direct my focus.

II. Forgetting the Self
It is already widely recognized that Nietzsche describes forgetting not as an absence or lack of memory but rather as an active force in its own right (GM II,
§ 1). This feature of Nietzsche's philosophy has been briefly noted by numerous
commentators and is emphasized indirectly in the work of Deleuze, who writes
extensively about the significance of active forces in relation to reactive ones in
Nietzsche's work (Deleuze, 1983, pp. 39-72). 6 But how Nietzsche casts the nature
of this activity and its vi~ity with regard to forgetting continues to be mischaracterized and misunderstood. Alan Schrift, writing of Deleuze's contributions
to understanding Nietzsche's philosophy in terms of"becoming," ties active for-

getting to "the sovereign individual" (Schrift, 1995, p. 74), and this figure has
played a prominent role in numerous other interpretations of Nietzsche's vision
for the future ofhumanity.
The figure of the sovereign individual makes its lone appearance in Nietzsche's corpus in the section of the Genealogy that immediately follows the one
identifying forgetting as an active force. Schrift links forgetfulness, as it is as-

cribed by Nietzsche to "a form of robust health" in GM U, § l, with the power and
freedom allegedly claimed and enjoyed by the sovereign individual as described
in GM II, §. 2. According to this view, the first two sections appear thematically
continuous: the entity described in the first section is the same as that described
in the second. But the proximity of the passages is deceptive. In those few paragraphs, Nietzsche provides a sweeping overview of a story of the moralization
ofhumankind-ofthe production of"humanity," what Nietzsche also describes
as the "animal with the right to make promises." He covers qmsiderable ground
between his reference to the active force of forgetting and the so-called fruit that
is the sovereign individual It is crucial that one appreciate that great distance if
one is to understand the vision Nietzsche reaches toward at the end of the very
same essay, in which he speculates about the future development of humanity,
or what he at times designates as "overhumanity." In other words, to understand
how. Nietzsche envisions the possibilities of overhumanity, one must understand
the importance given to forgetting and how it stands in relation to what is said
about the sovereign individual.
The moral ideal that Nietzsche finds in the history of philosophy from
Plato to Schopenhauer is one that increasingly prizes willing, and in so doing,
ties it to responsibility, autonomy, and freedom: the greater one's exercise ofwill,
the more complete one becomes, the more one realizes the real potential of humanity, the more being, or actuality, one achieves. Acquiring the relevant form

of willing to reach this ideal requires the development of memory, specifically
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"memory of will" (GM II,§ 1). Such memory ls crucial for the establishment of
what Nietzsche describes as a "long chain of will" in which the original "I will"
(or the promise of ~orne action or deed) and "the actual discharge of the will,"
that is, the action or actions one actually undertakes, remain essentially bound
despite changes of circumstance and the emergence of other desires and acts of
will. Taking this on as a goal, human beings have cultivated powers of memory
that significantly outstrip those of forgetting, and the service of this end has had
dramatic secondary effects, including how one regards the past, present, and future, and the expectations one has of others and oneself. In particular, what we
might call the "memory project" requires certain dispositions toward the past
and future and the necessity of securing, determining, and effecting it in such
a way as to be in the position to maintain the "chain of will" mentioned above;
all of this is needed to secure the conditions that make it possible to fulfill the
promise made in the past and to make human affairs as regular and predictable
as possible in the future in order to ward off circumstances that would interfere

Forgetting the Subject

The ideal of the sovereign individual is the goal or the ultimate fruit sought by
the process of moralization and refinement of conscience. It is a serious mistake
to read it as Nietzsche's ideal, for when one does so, one remains blind to the fact
that the sovereign individual is the very ideal that Nietzsche seeks to replace and
whose possible overcoming Zarathustra heralds.
Emphasis in the critical literature on the centrality of the sovereign individual obscures Nietzsche's emphasis on forgetting and its importance in human moral psychology in the second essay of GM. This is espectally so because
those who are wont to emphasize sovereign individuality as Nietzsche's central
counterimage and ideal in the Genealogy also celebrate promising as the signatur~
feature of this ideal. But it is the demands of the economy of promise-making that
have necessitated the development of memory (and secondarily reason) and the
diminution of forgetting that Nietzsche thinks is responsible for the degenerate
state of the "sick animals" we have become. Thus, some further scrutiny of the
sovereign individual and how it stands in relation to forgetting is warranted.

with the execution of the relevant actions dictated by the economy of prom-

I have discussed problematic readings of the sovereign individual at greater

ise-keeping. Nietzsche thus sees the telos of this kind of willing as inextricably
bound with: 1) the development of reason, 2) a very peculiar sense of history and
temporality, and 3) a philosophical anthropology in which "Man himself must
first of all have become calculable, regular, necessary, even in his own image of
himself, if he is to be able to stand security for his own future, which is what one

length elsewhere (Acampora, 2004), so I shall only recap the most salient points
of those arguments. For Nietzsche, pursuit of the ideal of the sovereign individual
has produced creatures-that is, the animals we call human-who are in many
respects dystrophic and dysfunctional. By emphasizing the activity of forgetting
and its diminution in the process of enhancing the will, the second essay of the
Genealogy commences an account of a struggle between two opposing forces:
remembering and forgetting. Their relation can be thought of in terms similar
to the agonistic dynamic of the artistic forces of the ApolJinian and Dionysian in
The Birth ofTragedy. (l shall highlight one aspect of this similarity in later sections
insofar as forgetting is linked with Dionysian self-forgetting and the disruption
of the boundaries that remembrance establishes.) Just as our physical health depends upon the accomplishment of nutrition through an active process of consumption and digestion so does the formation of our psychic life occur through
"inpsychation" (Einverseelung), which is achieved in the interactive processes
of taking in experience and excreting what is unnecessary or undesirable to absorb. A disruption _of this catalytic dynamic of opposing forces risks dyspepsia.
We can, Nietzsche claims, suffer from a kind of mental agita when our ability to
"be done with" our experiences is compromised. Forgetting is important for this
reason and numerous others that Nietzsche stresses elsewhere in his writings.
The task of the second essay is to describe how this is the current human condition and to envision a way of restoring the health that has been compromised.
The news is not all bad for Nietzsche: the "breeding of the animal given theca-

who promises does!" (GM II,§ 1).
The human being who stands security for his or her own future, though, is
quite different from the creature with which GM II begins. That creature is described in terms of being an animal, and although human beings certainly retain
their animality for Nietzsche, they are nonetheless cultivated to such an extent
that they are not merely animals or, at least, are animals that have been bred to
distance themselves from those of other species. In Nietzsche's Genealogy. it is the
development of conscience more than reason that distinguishes human beings,
and the second essay in particular examines how such a conscience is produced
and how it played a role in effecting the kind of animals modern human beings
are. At the end of this process stands the ideal of "the sovereign individual":
If we place ourselves at the end of this tremendous process, where the ~ree
at last brings forth fruit, where society and the morality of custom at last
reveal what they have simply been the means to: then we discover that the
ripest fruit is the sovereign individual, like only to himself, liberated again
from morality of custom, autonomous and supramoral (for "autonomous"
and "moral" are mutually exclusive), in short, the man who has his own
independent, protracted will and the capacity to make promises [der versprechen darfl-and in him a proud consciousness, quivering in every
muscle, of what has at length been achieved and become flesh in him, a
consciousness o(his own power and freedom, a sensation of mankind
come to completion. (GM II, § 2; Kaufmann and Hollingdale's translation emended)

pacity to make promises" (GM II,§ I) that required the special strengthening
of memory produced creatures that possess a peculiar capacity for willing. That
capacity has tremendously creative possibilities, which is what makes humankind so interesting (GM 1, § 6). By the end of GM 11, Nietzsche essentially asks

What now? ... How can we recover from the psychic dyspepsia of our moralization in the deployment of the special capacity for willing we acquired along the
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way? But we do not hear that question, and thus cannot pursue it along with or
without Nietzsche's Zarathustra, if we remain fixated on the very activity that
instigated our decadence, namely the atrophy of memory and the valorization
of remembering that promising required.
The value of forgetting also points toward a conception of the subject that
is difficult to conceive and frequently ignored, namely one that is not a specific
entity or essence but rather a composite of interacting forces. Nietzsche writes
in GM II, § I, that forgetting is valuable and necessary because it allows for an
evacuation of consciousness that frees it for other pursuits and preoccupations.
This regulatory functioning is important because "our organism is oligarchically
arranged." In describing the subject in this way, Nietzsche gestures backtoward
ideas that he develops more elaborately in BGE, §§ 16-20, in which he challenges
the metaphysics of subjectivity, the ways in which we conceive of selves and individuals, and how he described the mistaken ideas we have about subjectivity
based on our projection of a "doer behind the deed" in GM I,§ 13:

Forgetting the Subject

accounts for its freedom and is somehow realized in exercising its right to make
promises (for my criticism of the translation of der versprechen darj. see Acampora, 2004). But I find the conclusion of the passage more interesting and relevant. What is it that makes the life of the sovereign individual desirable? How
does it attract those inspired to pursue it? The real promise of the sovereign individual is a particularly powerful sensation: "a proud consciousness, quivering
in every muscle, of what has at length been achieved and become flesh in him, a
consciousness of his own power and freedom, a sensation of mankind come to
completion" (GM II,§ 2). There is an aesthesis of power that courses throughout the entire economy of promise-making-making promises, breaking them,
and punishing others who are unable or unwilling to keep promises, and it is so
great that humans have even instigated their own further deformity in the form
of diminishing their powers of forgetting in order to pursue that feeling. The
"sovereign individual" is a peculiar conceptual accretion formed by the gravitational pull of the sensation of power that accumulates through the processes

of cultivating memory and will to the degree that promising becomes not only
A quantum of force is equivalent to a quantum of drive, will, effect-more,
it is nothing other than precisely this very driving, willing, effecting, and
only owing to the seduction of language (and of the fundamental errors
of reason that are petrified in it) which conceives and misconceives all effects as conditioned by something that causes effect, by a "subject," can
it appear. otherwise. [...) there is no such substratum; there is no "being"
behind doing, effecting, becoming; "the doer" is merely a fiction added to
the deed [...) Scientists do no better when they say"force moves," "forces
cause," and the like- [...] our entire science still lies under the misleading influence oflanguage.
More will be said about the role of language below. For now it is important to
notice that the idea of a free and sovereign individual of the likes described in
the ideal identified at GM II,§ 2, is simply at odds with much else that Nietzsche
conceives about individuality and how he conceives the subject. This ·lack of
consistency between the radically free sovereign individual and what Nietzsche
writes elsewhere about the subject is reason enough to be suspicious about taking
it as Nietzsche's ideal. Combine that with the facts that the sovereign individual
appears in no other place in Nietzsche's writings, that its signature characteristic of promise-making is not touted as a laudable or distinguishing feature of
nobility either in the Genealogy or in any ofNietzsche's other writings (indeed,
one finds barely any references to making a promise at all in Nietzsche's other
texts), and one has very little reason to believe (and certainly little ground to
argue) that the sovereign individual is an important idea that Nietzsche wants
to retain at all.
So, what is the brief account of the sovereign individual describing if not
a goal that Nietzsche seeks to pursue? Virtually every commentary on the passage in question emphasiZes the apparent strength of will of the sovereign, which

desirable but also possible. It is a conceptual ideal that has oriented the pr«:>CCss
of moralization, finally culminating in modern rationalistic accounts of human
subjectivity. Modern individuals, for Nietzsche, have become something of monstrous creatures; the hypertrophy of reason is advanced by an undercurrent of
the dystrophy of forgetting.
Thus far, I have focused my discussion of Nietzsche's conception of the
relation between subjectivity and forgetting on the idea that what we call the
subject is formed through forces (Kraften) of remembering and forgetting and
on how the formative influence of forgetting has been diminished. Elsewhere
in Nietzsche's writings, he emphasizes the significance of forgetting in the process of conceptualization more genera1ly: not only is our concept of the subject
formed through an activity of forgetting, all concepts are, and this bears on how
we regard the relation between our ideas and what they are supposed to identify
and describe.
Sarah Kofman emphasizes the role of forgetting in the activity of conceptualization. In Nietzsche and Metaphor, she elaborately describes how Nietzsche
considers the formation of concepts as a metaphorical activity, an artistic and
inventive process (hence not simply mirroring objects). Casting things in terms
of concepts is a specialized form of metaphorical thinking. A distinctive feature of this kind of thought, however, is that we have forgotten its metaphorical
nature. Moreover, in tying the conceptual to the true and the real, that which
is acknowledged as metaphor, in contrast, has been cast aside as less desirable,
less pure, derivative, and ultimately less powerful, a pale imitation or image of
what truly is.
Kofman makes much of NietzsChe's claim that the specialized language
and conceptualization that philosophy utilizes is metaphorical, which we have
forgotten is metaphorical:
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Because of this fetishization of value, the fact that value is the product
of evaluation gets forgotten, and the latter is now measured against the
former; the fact that the concept results from a metaphorical activity gets
forgotten, and it is taken for a transcendent model, with all specific things
and actions being simply degraded copies or simulacra of it. The phantasmatic construction of a transcendent world means that the genesis of the
measuring standard gets forgotten. (Kofman, 1993, p. 44)

The concept is based on metaphor, a metaphor of a metaphor, but it is judged as
the standard and, thereby, as superior in relation to the metaphoric process from
which it is derived, as itself proper. It forgets and denigrates its origin. The concept is based upon forgetting in another respect, too, insofar as its insistence on
sameness, regularity, and identity amounts to an active forgetting of differences

(Kofman, chapter 3, "The Forgetting of Metaphor," passim). Thus, the process of
conceptualization is itself a secondary metaphoric process that is itself derived
from the original metaphoric grasping that characterizes human understanding
and description of its experience. And this derivative, or secondary, metaphoric
transformation works in such a way that it forgets-in the sense of extracting or
refusing to recognize as significant-many differences, distinctions, and other
possible features that might be further investigated or otherwise emphasized.
Therefore, what we generally take to be the legitimate scrutiny of the world is
actually a willful blindness to and intentional forgetting of many different aspects of our experience.
Kofman emphasizes that Nietzsche replaces the traditional conception of
humankind as rational animals with the idea of the human as the metaphorical
animal (Kofman, pp. 2Sff). The shift does not signal that Nietzsche is tossing rationality to the wind or denying that it is a useful function of human cogllitive
activity. Instead, he is claiming that what we identify as reason is but one-and a
very specialized and, at times, narrow-kind of metaphorical activity, one that is
not based solely on remembering, recollecting, or purely reasoning but in which
much forgetting plays an active role. It is the capacity to engage in metaphorical thinking generally and to direct our actions in light of such that is characteristic of human being for Nietzsche. But humankind-committed as it is to
its conception of humanity, the good as such, and the relentless reduction of all
existence to conformity of what it calls reason-is currently experiencing a kind
of stasis (e.g.,
Preface, § 3). What must we do in order to create something
beyond ourselves, and what would it mean to "overcome man," as Zarathustra
puts it and as Nietzsche anticipates it in On the Genealogy of Morals II, § 24 and
throughout the third essay?
The conception of the subject that drives the ideal of the sovereign individual supplies a fundamental sense of boundary and containment. It serves as a
primary metaphor that is extended and applied to our understanding generally;
it supplies the formal Structure for extension of our other metaphorical activities
and serves as a rule or g~ide for the assertion of limits and boundaries utilized

z.
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in cognition more broadly. It grounds a feature of reason that might very well be
undermined if we developed a different conception of self. If we supplant the idea
of the subject as responsible (remembering) agent, we might very well require and
develop a different kind oflogic. (I shall return to this point in the fourth section
below, where I discuss the role of forgetting in developing an ecstatic logic.)
The overcoming of humanity involves overcoming, by reconsidering and
reconceiving, our concept of humanity. This occurs not simply by redescribing
or renaming the human. And it involves even more than revaluing humanity
in the sense of asserting different ways of conceiving of the value of human life
and the possibilities for human community. What the story of the sovereign
individual from GM II, § 2, helps us to appreciate (once the roles of promising
and remembering are better understood in their context) is the significance of
the organization of desire in the specification of choice-worthy ends or ideals.
Following the first two sections of the second essay of the G,enealogy that have
been the main focus of this part of the paper, Nietzsche suggests a rather sinis-

ter motivation for the process of moralization that is guided by the ideal of the
subject as a responsible agent, and he ties this to a history of the development
of reason. It is to this genealogy that I turn ;iS prelude to discussions of the ways
in which the reactivation and renewed cultivation of forgetting might facilitate
the replacement of the concept of humanity that Nietzsche associates with such
destructive ends and motives.

Ill. Memory's Cruelty and the Development of Reason
If further evidence is needed for Nietzsche's emphasis on the significance of forgetting and the disaster that the emphasis on remembering has wrought, one
need only consider the remainder of the second essay of the Genealogy. The rest
of the essay is devoted to the history of the moralization of humanity, specifically
the production of conscience and bad conscience. Conscience, Nietzsche claims,
became possible through torturous processes of mnemonics that aimed to instill
a sense of duty and obligation that required the extirpation of forgetting. What
do we need in order to have a conscience? Nietzsche claims it fundamentally
rests upon the cultivation of special powers of memory. "'How can one create a
memory for the human animal? How can one impress something upon this incarnate forgetfulness, attuned only to the passing moment, in such a way that it
will stay there?'" (GM II, § 3, translation emended).
Nietzsche offers graphic examples ofhow "mnemotechnics" have been employed in the form of human sacrifice and mutilation: "all this has its origin in
the instinct that realized that pain is the most powerful aid to mnemonics" (GM
II, § 3). It is clear that Nietzsche conceives quashing forgetfulness as the way in
which ascetic practices achieved the fixity of their standards and norms. Memory was quite literally emblazoned in the psyche, initially by means of torture

of the body, to render the ideals of asceticism "inextinguishable, ever-present,
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unforgettable" and also to free "these ideas from the competition of all other
ideas, so as to make them :unforgettable"' in the sense that there is no possible
alternative to eclipse them or win out as desirable in comparison or contrast with
them. Nietzsche writes, "the severity of the penal code provides an especially
significant measure of the degree of effort needed to overcome forgetfulness and
to impose a few primitive demands of social existence as present realities upon
these slaves of momentary affect and desire" (GM II, § 3). So, a goal of ascetic
mnemnotechnics was the permanent fixation of desire such that no other possible goal could even emerge on the horizon as one worthy of pursuit, much less
as a potential rival. Again, Nietzsche's description of the techniques employed to
acquire such direction of desire is quite graphic: the penal codes and sagas detail
punishments involving flaying or boiling alive, trampling by horses, ripping the
criminal body to shreds, piercing the body and cutting out the vital organs while
the criminal is alive, stoning, crushing the skull on the wheel, and so on-and
all of this in full public view. These practices have the purpose of producing a

kind of ecstasies it provides, the way in which it effects its outside once the scope
of consideration is expanded beyond the Genealogy. Nietzsche's emphasis on the
Dionysian and his earlier reflections on history indicate important connections
between forgetting and the kind of freedom it can provide.
In The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche associates the Dionysian with the dis~
solution of boundaries, a forgetting of the self, and the basis for an alternative
way of symbolically interpreting what it means to be a human being, to have a
human body, and to live a human life. It is interesting to observe how the idea
of forgetting the subject is described and elaborated-das Subjective zu vOlliger
Selbstvergessenheit hinschwindet (BT, § 1). The Dionysian is not simply a breaking
of boundaries, an absence of self, or a sheer loss of measure. As Nietzsche identi~
fies the features of subjectivity that are dissolved in Dionysian self~forgetting, he
also draws attention to a joining, or union, with something else, to the realization
of some other possibility that is not a part of ordinary human subjective experi~
ence. Two exemplary passages will have to suffice. In the first, Nietzsche indicates

memory that contains "five or six 'I will not's' in regard to which one had given

that the Dionysian is emblematic of the possibility of forgetting definitive human

one's promise so as to participate in the advantages of society" (GMII, § 3). This
is the brutal basis of promising that Nietzsche highlights, and he thinks it also
serves as the primal basis of reasoning: "it was indeed with the aid of this kind
of memory that one at last came 'to reason'!" (GM II,§ 3).
Nietzsche's anticipated overcoming of humanity, which I have suggested
~ight include reassignment of the boundaries of the self and its attendant con~
ception of reason, might also be seen as an overcoming of the torture and cru~
elty that lie at reason's fundamental basis. lit this sense, crossing the boundaries
that were erected in forging the ideal of the sovereign subject signals not only a
kind of liberation but also, at least potentially, a new kind of compassion or, at
least, relief from prospective torture that the further "advancement" of reason
might require. Forgetting the subject could entail foregoing the brutality of the
practices that served modern processes of subjectification.

characteristics, such as walking upright and the use of verbal language: "In song
and dance man expresses himself as a member of a higher community; he has
forgotten [verlernt] how to walk and speak and is on the way toward flying into
the air, dancing" (BT, § 1). This prospectively connects one to amore~than~human
community of other living beings, grounding other ways of meaningfully inter~
acting with them as one shares in their expressive and locomotive possibilities.
A second passage suggests a different relation to the human community that we
ordinarily take as our own: "The dithyramb is thus essentially different from all
other choral odes. The virgins who proceed solemnly to the temple of Apollo,
laurel branches in their hands, singing a processional hymn, remain. what they are
and retain their civic names: the dithyrambic choric is a chorus of the.transformed
[Verwandelten] whose civic past and social status have been totally forgotten"
(BT. § 8, translation emended). This characterization of Dionysian possibi1ities
envisions forgetting (or forgoing) two further defining characteristics of human
community: civic identity and social standing. The Apollinian standpoint strives
to remain and retain; the Dionysian conjures a different set of possible relations
among human beings, ones that are not principally organized along Apollin~
ian lines. Thus forgetting is not simply a loss. In The Birth of Tragedy and in the
numerous other discussions of the Dionysian elsewh~re in Nietzsche's writings,
forgetting is liberating not only because it frees one from certain claims and ties
but also because it frees one to form new associations and different affiliations,
to have, gain, or save what would not be had otherwise.
There are two further points about forgetting that I wish to briefly mention,
both warranting more elaboration than such a brief paper allows: 1) the relevance
of forgetting in the formation of basic concepts that also inform how we conceive
of the character and place of logic (anticipating what others have described as

IV. The Freedom of Forgetting: Ecstatic Logic and History
Near the end of Derrida's 1968lecture "The Ends of Man," he identifies the spirit
of a disruptive form of critique of the concept ofhumanism in Nietzsche's idea of
active forgetting, linking it to the laughter of the lion in Thus Spoke Zarathustra
(although Nietzsche himself associates forgetting with the figure of the child).
The lion does not violently destroy but, rather, radically forgoes by ferociously
laughing at its opposition. Derrida writes: "His laughter then will burst out,
directed toward a return which no longer will have the form of the metaphysi~
cal repetition of humanism .... He will dance, outside the house [of Being, as
Heidegger describes it], the aktive Vergesslichkeit, the 'active forgetting' and the
cruel (grausam) feast of which the Genealogy of Morals speaks" (Derrida, 1982,
p. 136)? It is worthwhile iO consider this link between active forgetting and the

i i
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"ecstatic logic") and how this supplies important critical tools, and 2) the way in
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which Nietzsche ties forgetting to the definition and formation of the subject (i.e.,
that he does not simply valorize formlessness or meaninglessness). Introduction
of these themes provides a basis for the condudirig discussions of how Nietzsche
considers forgetting as a condition for the possibility of happiness and goodwill

toward others and of how forgetting might bear on other issues in moral and
social philosophy even if one would rather leave Nietzsche behind.
An ecstatic logic is one that investigates and interrogates or challenges
the terms upon which logic unfolds and proceeds. (It is one of the two kinds of
critique at issue in Derrida's discussion at the conclusion of "The Ends of Man"

[e.g., p. 135]). It questions, or contests, the foundations oflogic and the basic concepts upon which it rests. An ecstatic logic does not simply "stand out" oflog~c
in a flight into the irrational or illogical; rather, it is one in which the terms of
development, conflict, incorporation are potentially themselves transgressed,
reoriented, in play (and accounts for Nietzsche's association of forgetting with
the child rather than the lion in Z). One "stands out," achieves ekstasis, not sim-

ply through a rejection of logic but through an interrogation of the foundations
of logic (the reflective ground that logic itself might not provide). Overcoming
such challenges might result in a redefinition of the very terms upon which logic
progresses. This appears to be, at least in part, what Nietzsche has in mind in his
conception of the relation of the Apollinian and Dionysian with regard to the
dynamic of erecting boundaries and distinctions and then erasing, annihilating,
or transgressing them in the course of the Apollinian-Dionysian agon.
I have emphasized the connection between the Dionysian and the forgetting of measure in The Birth of Tragedy, claiming that it is more than a sheer
celebration of liberation from claims of reason, more than just the absence of
any boundaries. This point requires further elaboration, which I can only begin here. (For an excellent account ofthe place of measure in Nietzsche, see
Van Tongeren, 2002. One also finds a stunning and sweeping account of the
significance of the measureless [das Masslose1 and ecstatic logic in Sallis, 1991,
although I think the relation between das Masslose and restraint needs yet more
explanation and emphasis.) The selfless Dionysian appears to be fully liberated:
free from the limitations associated with confinement within boundaries of the
modern conception of subjectivity, free of the values and standards that issue
from that determination. I write "appears" because this kind of freedom, which

I take the early Nietzsche to find rather provocative but fundamentally unsatisfying, seems to be nearly exclusively negative. I think even the early Nietzsche
takes it to be also meaningless. To make "the crossing into the abyss" toward
which the Dionysian draws us is to completely lose ourselves insofar as we lack
any relative relation in light of which the transgression of the boundary has any
significance. Without such context it disables or disengages the norms it breaks,
but Nietzsche envisions such crossing as also enabling and engaging possibilities
for reformation and re-creation. Meaningful freedom for Nietzsche has both the
negative and this positive· aspect.

Forgetting the Subject
The formatiVe role of forgetting in the shaping of the subject and its possibilities for happiness and concern for others are described in relation to our desire
to remember and memorialize in Nietzsche's On the Uses and Disadvantages of
History for Life (hereafter HL). For now, I wish to focus on the formative process,
deferring the rest for discussion below. Although Nietzsche describes the forgetting of the Dionysian in The Birth of Tragedy as in opposition to the plastic powers
of the Apollinian, in HL he describes forgetting as intimately tied to the exercise
of plastic powers, which he defines as "the capacity to develop out of oneself in
one's own way, to transform and incorporate into oneself what is past and foreign,
to heal wounds, to replace what has been lost, to recreate broken moulds" (HL,
p. 62). Too much remembering can become meaningless and stultifying:
Imagine the extremest pos~ible example of a man who did not possess the
power of forgetting at all and who was thus condemned to see everywhere
a state ofbecoming: such a man would no longer believe in his own being,
would no longer believe in himself, would see everything flowing asunder
in moving points and would lose himself in this stream of becoming....
Or, to express my theme even more simply: there is a degree of sleepless-

ness, ofrumination, of the historical sense, which is harmful and ultimately
fatal to the living thing, whether this living thing be a man or a people or a
culture. (HL, p. 62) 8
Forgetting, it seems, is an important condition for experience-important for
giving the shape, form, rhythm, texture, and depth that make the seemingly
endless streain of possible objects of concern and attention an experience, to
recall Dewey's famous distinction. This occurs not simply by piling up experiences but also by taking some away, by encouraging some to fade, recede, fall
away. Forgetting in this sense grants rather than evacuates or eliminateSi too
much remembering leaves us with experience without pause and strips from us
possibilities for action.
What determines the limit, the degree to which forgetting is necessary, the
point at which remembering becomes poisonous? After all, too much forgetting
is also dangerous. Strength and health are characterized by the capacity to efficiently and creatively incorporate experience; "that which such a nature cannot subdue it knows how to forget" (HL, p. 63). This conception of the relation
between forgetting and the formation of the subject resonates with Nietzsche's
account of "inpsychation" in the dynamic of forgetting and remembering- in
GM ll, § 1. which he also compares with processes of nutrition. In HL he puts it
thus: "a living thing can be healthy, strong and fruitful only when bounded by
a horizon; if it is incapable of drawing a horizon around itself, and at the same
time too self-centred to enclose its own view within that of another, it will pine
away slowly or hasten to its timely end"' (HL, p. 63). The human needs to be "'just
as able to forget at the right time as to remember at the right time" (HL, p. 63).

Nietzsche continues the theme later in the essay when he writes, "Sometimes,
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however, this same life that requires forgetting demands a temporary suspen·
sion of this tOrgetfulness; it wants to be dear as to how unjust the existence of
anything-a privilege, a caste, a dynasty, for example-is, and how greatly this
thing deserves to perish. Then its past is regarded critically, then one takes the
knife to its roots, then one cruelly tramples over every kind of piety,. (HL, p. 76).
Critical history is an example of remembering at the right time.
Forgetting is important for monumental history, for creating the possibil·
ity for some things to stand out as exceptional by letting other things fall away,
but it is also important that monumental history not rule or dominate the other
modes (antiquarian and critical). It is not simply a willful fictionalizing of all
history, for when that happens "the past itself suffers harm: whole segments of
it are forgotten, despised, and flow away in an uninterrupted colourless flood"
(HL, p. 71). What Nietzsche advocates instead is the cultivation of a sense for the
"unhistorical." He explains:

the ability to forget .... He who cannot sink down on the threshold ofthe moment
and forget all the past ... will never know what happiness is-worse, he will never
do anything to make others happy" (HL, p. 62; my emphasis). I take Nietzsche to
mean that our happiness is not achieved simply by balancing out pleasures and
pains. The sheer joy we take in the affiliation with loved ones, for example, is not
founded upon balancing or canceling out the hardships we have also shared with
them. Our joy in companionship does not simply bubble up occasionally out of
a context in which we equalize and then exceed the despair we have also shared.
Joy rushes out from a moment when suffering is forgotten, and in that moment it
is as though our pains never existed at a11. Our pleasures and pains differ not only
quantitatively, or in degrees of intensity, but also qualitatively, with differences in
kind. Some pains that we suffer simply cannot be canceled or balanced by past or
future pleasures-the death of a child, the witnessing of torture and humiliation
of others, the long slow pain of debilitating illness. Were it not for forgetting, joy
following such experiences would be simply impossible. Forgetting is significant

With the word "the unhistorical" I designate the art and power offorgetting
and of enclosing oneself within a bounded horizon; I call "suprahistorical"
the powers which lead the eye away from becoming towards that which
bestows upon existence the character of the eternal and stable, towards
art and religion. Science ... hates forgetting, which is the death of knowledge, and seeks to abolish all limitations of horizon and launch mankind
upon an infinite and unbounded sea oflight whose light is knowledge of

for our attention to the happiness of others, too, Nietzsche claims, and it is this
relevance to the possibility of community that I want to briefly highlight as one
of the ways in which Nietzsche's meditations on forgetting might be relevant to
other concerns in moral and social philosophy.

Y- Forgetting Ourselves and Saving Community

all becoming. (HL, p. 120)

others. His On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life opens with a medita-

Insofar as forgetting the subject potentially supplies us with different possibilities for conceptualizing human subjectivity and individuality, as argued above,
it may be rel~vant to resolving certain tensions in moral and social philosophy
that pit the interests of the self and its autonomy against the interests _of others
and their claims on us for assistance and nurturance. It might very well be that
different possibilities for conceiving and resolving these tensions open when
seen in light of a different conceptual basis of subjectivity. We find similar relations between alternative conceptions of selves and different social and moral
possibilities, for example, in care ethics and its conception ofthe relational self,
and the compassionate basis of Buddhist ethics and its "no-self" model. What
different possible ethics might we be able to conceive in saving the forgetting
of subjectivity?
Forgetting the self in the ways I have suggested above might soften the rigid
boundaries of the dominant view of the self and provide more porous access to
a shared basis of human subjectivity and recognition of fragility. For a possible
connection between such a subject and an ethics of generosity, see Cixous and
Clement (1986; see also Schrift, 1995, pp. 82-101). Although I cannot engage this
literature in this paper, I do think that the nature of forgetting that happens in
the alternative logic of the economy of the gift, as it is described, needs further
exploration. The character of such forgetting is not fully developed in the work

tion on this theme. Nietz~che writes, "In the case of the smallest or of the greatest
happiness. however, it is always the same thing that makes happiness happiness:

work might make useful contributions.

Thus Nietzsche reaches conclusions about the relation between forgetting and
remembering, having limits and being free, and being and becoming that are at
odds with much of the tradition and even certain strands of his other thinking.
Nietzsche's readers would expect him to praise a perspective that appreciates
becoming and prioritizes it over being, but in HL Nietzsche describes how such
genuine appreciation is actually thwarted and suggests that our ap~rehension of
being, made possible when we can "pause" experience by letting some of it drop
out from its stream, is a condition for the direction of our actions and our assessments of our possibilities. Too much remembering actually makes us less able to
know or to hold on to experiences such that they can stand out as meaningful.
But too much forgetting is also detrimental, particularly in light of our possibilities for freedom. Although forgetting superficially promises freedom, Nietzsche
argues that the conditions of meaningful freedom are realized in an interactive
dynamic in which remembering and forgetting each play a role in constituting
the subject, enable it to incorporate its experience, and reconstitute it in light of
what it has been and might possibly become.
I previously noted that in HL, Nietzsche further claims that forgetting is
important both for our happiness and our ability to attend to the well-being of

of Cixous and Clement, and it is toward such a project that I think Nietzsche's
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In his book on the phenomenology of remembering, Casey (1987) argues
that an emphasis on the overcoming of forgetfulness in the modern tradition
results in an even greater forgetfulness (or marginalization) of remembering
than does forgetting itself. But perhaps the diminution of forgetting is tied to
the problem of failures of recognition and granting {and hence to coping and
understanding) of the fragility ofhuman existence. Lest we think we have passed
through the age of cruelty (in the formation of mnemonics}, we might give further

consideration to the idea that the marginalization of forgetting in the conceptualization of the significance of remembering is also tied to how we conceive the
objects of our concern (human and otherwise) in terms of control, domination,
power, which Heidegger and many others explore. Our conceptions of forgetting
bear on these discussions, which have further implications and applications in
our moral and social philosophies.
Casey also emphasizes the significance of remembering for building community and notices that the disappearance of remembering demotes the role. of
elders (Casey, 1987, p. 7). Drawing on the ideas elaborated here, we might also
say that the marginalization of forgetting also demotes the value of the elderly in
our society. They are forgotten, in part, because it is believed they have nothing
valuable to contribute (inferior as "storage" devices to books, movies, COs, etc.),
and because they are feared as the emblems of forgetting. In a social context in
which a characteristic of human existence is defined in terms Of being an efficient manager of memory storage, the sluggishness or inability of the elderly to
engage in memory retrieval results in a perceived loss of humanity. If forgetting
is replaced at the center of our conception of humanity, its appearance in our
everyday lives and in the macrorhythms of human life more generally might appear less monstrous and afford different possibilities for how we relate to persons
who appear to have a surplus of forgetting.
Nietzsche's praise of forgetting should by no means be taken as a dismissal
or denigration of remembering (notice the point about critical history and the
formation of boundaries and horizons that the dynamic of remembering and
forgetting makes possible). As I have argued, forgetting the subject is not simply
a celebration of mindlessness or oblivion. Nietzsche's emphasis on the activity
of forgetting and its implied interactive context (as a formative force shaping
the individual, analogous to the formative forces of the Apollinian and Dionysian in BT) suggests that the forgetfulness of forg~tting, the marginalization of
forgetting bodes ill for remembering, too. Delving a bit further into the analogy
indicated in the Apollinian and Dionysian in BT is a worthy point of departure.
Just as forgetting the Dionysian resulted, for Nietzsche, in the deformity of the
Apollinian, so too does the forgetting of forgetting result in the transmogrification of remembering. Our conceptualization of these two possibilities is intimately related, and these conceptual formations give shape to and organize our
practices in the world, thereby giving structure to how we relate to each other ·
and other objects of concern.
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Notes
1. For translations of Nietzsche's texts, I use Hollingdale's HL, Kaufmann's B1' and
Z, and Kaufmann and Hollingdale's GM, unless otherwise indicated.
2. The famous ending of the Republic is worth recalling: "And so, Glaucon, the tale
was saved, as the saying is, and was not losl. And it will save us if we believe it,
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and we shall safely cross the River of Lethe, and keep our soul unspotted from the
world. But if we are guided by me we shall believe that the soul iS immortal and
capable of enduring all extremes of good and evil, and so we shall hold ever to the

upward way and pursue righteousness with wisdom always and ever, that we may
be dear to ourselves and to the gods both during our sojourn here and when we
receive our reward, as the victors in the games go about to gather in theirs. And
thus both here and in that journey of a thousand years, whereof I have told you,
we shall fare wel1 [eu prattOmen]." 1n his discussion of nobility as it relates to its

essential activity (in contrast to the reactivity of slave morality) in GMI. § 10, Nietzsche writes, .. they likewise knew, as rounded men replete with energy and therefore necessarily active, that happiness should not be sundered from action-being
active was with them necessarily a part of happiness (whence eu prattein takes its
origin)-all very much the opposite of' happiness' at the level of the impotent, the
oppressed, and those in whom poisonous and inimical feelings are festering, with
whom it appears as essentially narcotic, drug, rest, peace, 'sabbath,' slackening of
tension and relaxing of limbs, in short passively." The assoc:iation in Nietzsche of
forgetting with a kind of activity (GM II,§ 1), one crucial for happiness (e.g., HL,
p. 4 and GS, "Jokes,n § 4) echoes in this passage.
3. Forgetting is not the only process that has been rendered passive. Edward Casey
(1987) explores how the contemporary conceptualization of memory as instrumental and as part of an essentially passive process has its roots in the philosophies
of Plato (where remembering becomes instrumentalized) and Aristotle (where it
becomes construed as something passive). Nietzsche's point seems to be that both
forces, remembering and forgetting, are active and involved in an interactive dynamic that facilitates or grounds our distinguishing, valuing, or coming tO know
things.
4. Ultimately, Heidegger's view represents quite a departure from the Platonic sketch
offered above. Insofar as Heidegger thinks that truth is a relationship and an activity of disclosure, remembering what has been forgotten is a way of relating to
things in the world rather than the retrieval oflost knowledge.
5. Those interested in reviewing a collection of the few occasional remarks about
forgetting that are made by modern philosophers in particular might find Seidel
1966, pp. 81-98, of some use. Seidel's work on the nature of mind and consciousness
is now rather dated, but his general thesis about the relation between forgetting
as providing a reservoir of resources for creativity and his historical observatio~s
might be helpful to those pursuing relevant topics. There is also some brief discussion of forgetting in the history of philosophy in the context of a more elaborate
account of the history of remembering in Casey 1987. I make only a few references
to this work below, but it certainly would repay further study for those interested
in the themes of this paper.
6. Deleuze (1983) argues that Nietzsche distinguishes forces only in relation to quantity and that active and reactive forces differ with regard to whether they obey or
command in relation to each other (e.g., pp. 39-40). Consciousness is the work
of reactive force: "Consciousness merely expresses the relation of certain re~ctive
forces to the active forces which dominate them. Consciousness is essentially reactive; this is why we do iiot know what a body can do, or what activity it is' capable
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of(GS, § 354). And what is said of consciousness must also be said of memory and
habit .. (p. 41}. In contrast, ..The body's active forces make it a self and define the
self as superior and astonishing: ·A most powerful being, an unknown sage-he
is called the Self. He inhabits your body, he is your body' (Z I, 'Of the Despisers of
the Body,' p. 62)., (Deleuze, p. 42). If we map these to Nietzsche's.discussion of the
role of memory in the creation of consciousness, remembering is cast as a reacti've
force while forgetting is the active force that is responsible for the creation of the
subject more generally. In Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari offer some further
elaboration of this idea of the active forces forming the self, particularly in relation to forgetting when they attribute to Nietzsche the idea that (in relation to the
creation of the body as specified and articulated in terms of its parts, organs, and
functions, and therefore accountable in a system of desire and exchange) "iL is a
matter of creating a memory for man; and man, Who was constituted by means
of an active faculty of forgetting (oubli), by means of a repression of biological
memory, must create an other memory, one that is collective, a memory of words
(paroles) and no longer a memory of things, a memory of signs and no longer of
effects. This organization, which traces its signs directly on the body, constitutes
a system of cruelty, a terrible alphabet" (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, pp. 144-145).
What I take this tO mean is that our sense of ourselves as human beings, as having specifically human bodies and being specific human individuals, stems from
actively forgetting many facets and aspects of our bodies that we share with other
nonhuman animals. There is a process of carving up the body inlo parts that is
necessary for fitting them into a system of significanCes and meanings of what
constitutes our humanity and to what we would do well to aspire (Deleuze and
Guattari, p. 143).
7. Derrida's lecture begins with a call for a more attentive history of the development
of concepts, and he considers in greater detail the development ofthe idea of"the
human" (or, the concept "man") in phenomeno1ogy, particularly in Heidegger's
works. He distinguishes two ways to critically evaluate and challenge philosophical frameworks that supply the basis for conceptual economies (concepts that are
basic for others and are crucially interrelated). One critical approach works from
"within," attempting to open and expand the existing framework, and the other
approach works from "without" by seeking to abandon the rejected framework
and to effect a complete and total dissociation from it. Both risk failure insofar as
the first may well remain blind to what lies outside of itself and which could nevertheless be useful for the expansion and change it hopes to bring about. The second
critical apprOach risks failure insofar as it insists upon its absolute distinction to
such an extent that it might not recognize essential similarities that it holds and
adopts rather naively and might not subject those features to a thorough-going
critique (Derrida 1982, p. 135). Derrida associates Heidegger's work with the first
· kind of strategy and his own contemporary French thinkers with the second. He
appears to include Nietzsche in the second group as well, and it is at this point that
he brief1y mentions Nietzsche's idea of active forgetting as described above.
8. Some commentators and persons who asked questions when I gave earlier versions of this paper at conference meetings objected that Nietzsche does not really
praise forgetting, recalling that as Nietzsche writes in HL, even animals forget;
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what distinguishes us as humans is that we remember. I shall not address whether
this is literally true since it is not relevant to the present discussion or the broader
question of whether it is good for us to remember so much as we do, or to prize
memory of a certain sort as highly as we do and for the reasons that we do. It is
dear from this passage in HL that Nietzsche thinks that forgetting is essential to
vitality. Others further object that if Nietzsche has in mind a renewal of forgetting it must he a kind that is different from that of animals. This also strikes me
as unsupported. While many readers might be keen to distinguish human beings
as essentially different from all "other animals,"' Nietzsche is not. I am not making a wholly reductive claim here-I am not saying that for Nietzsche we are just
like all the other animals. Such a claim cannot be true if one thinks that "all the
other animals" as a contrast term with "'human beings" has no meaningful reference. All animals, Nietzsche seems to claim, need to forget in order to live: they
need to do this in order to function biologically (processes of digestion conceived
as forgetting) and in order to have any possible conscious psychic life (processes
of"inpsychation" mentioned above). Many specific animals may not have psychic
lives, and it might be that no other animals have cultivated the powers of memory
that human beings wrought in the processes of moralization. These speculations
and qualifications, however, do not imply that human forgetting is qualitatively
different from the kind of forgetting vital to all animal life.

Part Two

Laughing at the Margins
Nietzsche's Tragic/Comic Sense of Life

